The Singularity

by Lyle Burkhead

 

 

Critique of the ideas of I.J. Good and Vernor Vinge

Vernor Vinge's seminal 1993 essay on the Singularity is my point of departure in this section. I assume that the reader has opened Vinge's web page. It would also be helpful to print out a copy of his paper (I'm referring to a printed copy as I write this).

The first section of the essay is called "What is the Singularity?" He says

I argue in this paper that we are on the edge of change comparable to the rise of human life on earth. The precise cause of this change is the imminent creation by technology of entities with greater than human intelligence.

He doesn't really argue this point. There is a series of rather breathless paragraphs in which it is assumed that the existence of "this event" has already been established:

What are the consequences of this event?

From the human point of view, this change will be a throwing away of all the previous rules, perhaps in the blink of an eye, an exponential runaway beyond any hope of control.

I think it's fair to call this event a singularity...

Through the '60s and '70s and '80s, recognition of the cataclysm spread...

Wait a minute. He has not demonstrated that there is any such thing as "the cataclysm." Going back to the first of the sentences just quoted, he continues as follows:

What are the consequences of this event? When greater-than-human intelligence drives progress, that progress will be much more rapid. In fact, there seems to be no reason why progress itself would not involve the creation of still more intelligent entities -- on a still shorter time scale.

Why on a still shorter time scale? This is the precise point that needs to be established, but he doesn't argue for it, he just asserts it.

At the very beginning of the paper (the Abstract), Professor Vinge writes,

Within thirty years [from 1993], we will have the technological means to create superhuman intelligence. Shortly after, the human era will be ended.

We already have the means to create superhuman intelligence. Later, in his discussion of IA, he says (correctly)

But every time our ability to access information and to communicate it to others is improved, in some sense we have achieved an increase over natural intelligence. Even now, the team of a PhD human and good computer workstation (even an off-net workstation!) could probably max any written intelligence test in existence.

In other words superhuman intelligence already exists.

We can take this a step further: instead of one human and one computer, many humans and many computers. In a later section of the paper, Dr. Vinge says:

Use local area nets to make human teams that really work (ie, are more effective than their component members). This is generally the area of "groupware", already a very popular commercial pursuit. The change in viewpoint here would be to regard the group activity as a combination organism.

Such "combination organisms" already exist, and they design their successors. Teams of engineers using groupware design the next generation of groupware.

Back in the introductory section, he quotes I.J. Good:

Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an "intelligence explosion," and the intelligence of man would be left far behind.

Then Vinge comments,

Good has captured the essence of the runaway...

An ultraintelligent machine is defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Why is it necessary to postulate this? Does an ultraintelligent machine have to write better poetry than Rilke? Why? What does that have to do with designing even better machines? Does it have to prove theorems better than Andrew Wiles? Recognize investment opportunities better than Warren Buffett? Write literary criticism better than Northrop Frye? Obfuscate issues better than Michael Shermer? No. For the purpose of the present argument, it doesn't have to do any of that. It only has to do one thing better than anybody. (I'm leaving aside the question of how such a machine could come to exist in the first place.)

Suppose we try rephrasing the definition as follows: Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass any man, however clever, in the activity of designing machines.

With that definition, there are still three questions that need to be addressed. First, what does "far surpass" mean? How far is far enough? Suppose you have a machine that is one percent better than Seymour Cray at designing computers. Would that result in an intelligence explosion? What if the machine is ten percent better? A hundred percent better? It's not clear that this even means anything, i.e. it's not clear that "better" can be measured. But if it can, how much better does the machine have to be to result in an "intelligence explosion"?

The second question that needs to be addressed is this. Does it matter if ultraintelligence (defined as the ability to design machines) is localized on one machine, or distributed? What if you have a network of machines, any one of which is no more capable than a human engineer, but which, working together, can design computers better than Seymour Cray. Wouldn't that work just as well?

Finally, the third question. Suppose you have a network of computers. Some of them are autonomous, and some of are workstations operated by human programmers or engineers. This network can design computers better than Seymour Cray. Wouldn't that work just as well?

If one machine that can out-design Cray leads to an intelligence explosion, why wouldn't a network of machines, with some humans in the loop, lead to the same explosion?

Suppose you have a system of some kind (a "full fledged automated engineering system," as Eric Drexler says) which can design computer chips ten thousand times faster than any human engineer working alone. Whatever "far surpass" means, surely a factor of ten thousand would be enough. Such systems already exist. Intel can already design and build chips thousands of times faster than a human engineer. So can IBM, Texas Instruments, and several other companies. Any company that can make chips at all can do it thousands of times faster than a single human engineer working alone. (Of course these numbers don't really mean anything, since a human engineer working alone couldn't make chips at all.)

If a machine that can far surpass a human engineer leads to an "intelligence explosion," why doesn't a corporation that can far surpass a human engineer lead to the same explosion?

It's true that as soon as you have an entity (corporation, machine, or "combination organism") with a certain level of intelligence -- a level high enough to understand itself, and to undertake design projects -- it will design more intelligent successors. This happens all the time. Corporations restructure themselves. It isn't an explosion, it's an ongoing process.

Corporations redesign themselves over a period of years or decades. They also redesign the computers that they use (or they buy new computers designed elsewhere -- this doesn't affect the argument). The result is on the same level as the starting point. In other words, the improvement is incremental, not qualitative. General Electric, for example, is a "smarter" company now than it was 50 years ago, but it's still just a company. It hasn't reached a whole new level of intelligence. The difference between the GE of the year 2000 and its predecessor in 1950 is not like the difference between a man and a dog.

Some people will object that when I go from "ultraintelligent machine" to "corporation" I am making an illegal move, because Good and Vinge are assuming that a machine can be redesigned at all levels, and a system which includes humans cannot be redesigned at all levels. Only the mechanical part of it can be redesigned. The human part is just given. Humans can't be redesigned. To which I have two replies: (1) why not? and (2) so what?

It's going to be quite a while before computers are as complex as human brains. Neuroscience and cell biology are not going to be standing still in the meantime. By the time computers reach our present level of complexity, we will understand both our brains and our individual cells at a very fine-grained level, and we will have been redesigning ourselves for quite some time. Human re-engineering will be a well-established, ongoing activity.

It may turn out that the human brain is not as redesignable as computers. Our brains will, presumably, always have the same basic architecture they have now, but with computers we can start with a blank piece of paper and design a whole new architecture. But so what? As long as we have a seamless interface between our brains and the computers, the system as a whole won't be held back by the human component. Not only that, when computers reach the nanoscale level, we can incorporate them into our neurons, so there won't be any real distinction between us and them.


The next section of Vinge's paper is called "Can the Singularity be Avoided?" He describes a workshop where some of the participants thought that "our present [as of 1992] computer hardware might be as much as ten orders of magnitude short of the equipment we carry around in our heads." Then comes this statement:

If this is true (or for that matter, if the Penrose or Searle critique is valid), we might never see a Singularity.

I'm going to take the two parts of this statement separately.

If this is true, i.e. if there are ten orders of magnitude between 1992 computer hardware and the human brain, we might never see a Singularity.

Non sequitur, in two ways. (1) It doesn't matter how many orders of magnitude separate computer hardware from the human brain. An exponential curve will eventually cover as many orders of magnitude as necessary. It's just a matter of time. If there is any economic or military reason to build computers as complex as the human brain, then eventually such computers will be built. (2) The existence or nonexistence of such computers implies nothing about a Singularity.

Let's consider the other part of the statement:

...(or for that matter, if the Penrose or Searle critique is valid), we might never see a Singularity.

He doesn't give a reason for this assertion, he just segues into this:

Instead, in the early '00s we would find our hardware performance curves beginning to level off -- this because of our inability to automate the design work needed to support further hardware improvements.

Non sequitur. If Penrose and Searle are right, this implies nothing about hardware performance leveling off. Computer design is already semi-automated, and that's all we need for Moore's Law to continue.

He concludes this section,

We'd end up with some _very_ powerful hardware, but without the ability to push it further. Commercial digital signal processing might be awesome, giving an analog appearance even to digital operations, but nothing would ever "wake up" and there would never be the intellectual runaway which is the essence of the Singularity.

Non sequitur. If robots "woke up," that would not imply an intellectual runaway, and if they don't wake up, that does not imply that there will not be a runaway. Those are two independent things. Neither implies the other.

The distinction between "awake" and "not awake" is independent of intelligence. Idiots wake up in the morning just like anybody else. So do monkeys, dogs, birds, etc. If AI systems "woke up," this in itself would imply nothing about their ability to design more capable successors.

We are already awake, and we can redesign both our own hardware and the computers that we use. If AI systems reached our level and then "woke up," the situation would be exactly the same. They would be able to design their own successors exactly as well as we can.

The exponential runaway doesn't depend on AI systems reaching our level. To the extent that it's going to happen at all, it's already happening. We can continue to do what we are already doing. We can design ever more capable "combination organisms," in which we increase our capability, the computers increase their capability, and the system as a whole increases its capability. This improvement can continue with no foreseeable limit, even if AI systems never catch up with us.



Exponential functions don't have singularities!

Throughout this discussion, I have not questioned the assumption that an "exponential runaway" is the same thing as a singularity. In fact they are mutually exclusive concepts.

In physics, one has a singularity when a graph suddenly becomes infinite, i.e. y becomes infinite for a finite value of x, because the denominator becomes zero. This is a hyperbolic curve, not an exponential curve. An exponential curve does become infinite, but only as x becomes infinite.

In mathematics, a singularity is a point on a curve where it suddenly ceases to have a derivative, i.e. it has a cusp. Again, this has nothing to do with exponential functions. Exponential functions don't have cusps. They are smooth. An exponential curve has a derivative everywhere.

In Dr. Vinge's essay, the expressions "exponential runaway" and "intelligence explosion" are used interchangeably. Exponential growth is not the same as an explosion. If Moore's Law continues indefinitely, i.e. if information density continues to increase by an exponential function, this implies that there will not be a singularity in the mathematical sense. Exponential functions don't have singularities!

Combination organisms will soon include smart dust and grid computers which will use genetic algorithms to redesign themselves with less and less human supervision. If the capability of such combination organisms continues to grow exponentially, the result will indeed be a profound change. Professor Vinge says:

Developments that before were thought might only happen in "a million years" (if ever) will likely happen in the next century.

That much may be true (even if it is clumsily expressed). Exponential functions don't become infinite in a finite time, but they do transform linear time into logarithmic time. A thousand years will be compressed into a century. Not only that: if the exponential growth continues (a big if), the next thousand years will be compressed into a decade, the next thousand years will be compressed into a year, the next thousand will be compressed into a few weeks, and so forth. Exponential growth really is amazing. As we all know, we are living in Internet Time now, and it's just going to get better (or worse, as the case may be). Exponential functions don't become infinite in a finite time, but they do become so large that they might as well be infinite from a human point of view.

Strictly speaking, it's a misnomer to call this a "singularity," which would imply a unique moment, or an "explosion", which would imply a discontinuity in the graph. We should speak strictly about this. Here, as always, it's important to call things by their right names (or their True Names, as he would say). However, it might look like an explosion.

Someone standing outside this process and looking at it from the perspective of linear time might perceive it as an explosion or cataclysm, or maybe an algal bloom that suddenly engulfs everything. Someone who is on the inside, participating in it, living in logarithmic time, would perceive it very differently. When a thousand years of change is compressed into a few weeks, and the next thousand years is compressed into a few days, and then a few hours, and then a few minutes, and then a few seconds... There will come a day that apparently never ends. On that day, time as we know it will cease to exist.

That's the exponential runaway. Even though I think it's a misnomer, I'm going to go along with established usage and call this The Singularity.

Of course it's not a foregone conclusion that any such thing will happen. This scenario may represent a real event in our future, or (more likely) it may just be a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that Moore's Law (in some generalized form) will continue indefinitely.

Let's go back to the quotation we started with:

I argue in this paper that we are on the edge of change comparable to the rise of human life on earth. The precise cause of this change is the imminent creation by technology of entities with greater than human intelligence.

His first assertion is an understatement: the rise of human life on earth pales into insignificance compared with what's coming (if it happens). But the second assertion is totally wrong. This change has nothing to do with some kind of Frankenstein creature "waking up" in somebody's AI lab.

The exponential runaway requires combination organisms that can redesign themselves. Such combination organisms already exist. The runaway requires not artificial intelligence but artificial evolution. Such evolution is already happening. The theory of genetic algorithms is well-established.

All the pieces are in place. The stage is set. The exponential runaway has already started.

This doesn't require intelligence to increase exponentially. It doesn't require intelligence to increase at all. There are still some jobs that require creative thought, some that require strategic thought, and some that require a deep understanding of science, but more and more jobs are being dumbed down or automated. The ratio of intelligence to stupidity remains about the same. The "Dilbert" comic strip is in no danger of running out of material. A lot of things will change in the next thirty years, but one thing isn't going to change: we will still be demanding an answer to the perennial question, Why am I surrounded by morons?

However, that won't stop us from making faster and faster computers based on smaller and smaller circuits. Progress in computer technology doesn't depend on individual humans getting smarter. Still less does it depend on individual AI systems or robots catching up with individual humans.

We have to ask the crucial question: exponential runaway of what? If we are going to have a thousand years of change compressed into a decade, a year, etc., what is it that's changing? Not everything. Some things change and some don't. Change occurs against an unchanging background, or within an unchanging framework. To get this subject in focus, we have to distinguish between what is increasing exponentially and what isn't. The reason the exponential growth may continue for a long time is that it's not intelligence that is increasing exponentially.

 
 

 

Interlude -- two stories about intelligence

There are two distinct ways in which intelligence can be increased. Here are two stories to illustrate the difference.

The first story is from Blood in the Streets, by Davidson and Rees-Mogg, chapter one:

"In the dying days of the Chinese empire at the end of the last century [i.e. the 19th century], millions of Chinese rose in murderous protest against the domination of that country by the Western powers. This uprising, known as the Boxer Rebellion, offers clear illustrations of how important -- and difficult -- it is to update obsolete conceptions of reality.

"At the turn of the century, China was ruled by the Empress Dowager, Tz'u Hsi. Like most rulers of most places in most times, she considered all foreign interference with her rule barbaric insolence. So she ordered the Chinese military to support efforts by the Boxers to rid China of 'red-haired barbarians.'

"This should have been a laughingly easy matter. In the first place, the millions of Chinese enjoyed a tremendous numerical advantage. The foreigners were few in number and easy to identify. With the exception of the Japanese, they were all white. Furthermore, the foreigners had between them only 400 armed personnel -- the military guards attached to the diplomatic legations at Peking.

"When the Chinese military opened fire on these small groups huddled in the British legation the hope for any of the foreigners surviving would have seemed almost nil. They had few weapons, limited ammunition, little food and water. They were surrounded, and to all appearances, completely cut off from any hope of relief...

"The Chinese military was armed with modern weapons. Rapid-firing Krupp cannon. Breech-loading rifles. Modern machine guns. The way for reinforcements was blocked by four heavily armed forts, recently rebuilt by German engineers. In addition to the forts guarding a narrow waterway only 200 yards wide, the Chinese had four brand-new destroyers recently delivered from Germany.

"The Chinese had modern weapons but were incapable of using them effectively. ... So astonishing was the Chinese military incompetence that one of those trapped in Peking wrote in a diary, 'Had we been fighting such people as the Zulus or Dervishes we should have been polished off in two or three days.' One authority reports that the Chinese intentionally aimed their firepower over the heads of their enemies. Allegedly, the Chinese believed that their enemies' spirits resided in the area directly above their heads and were vulnerable to fusillades fired there. Whether for this or equally fantastic reasons, the Chinese consistently fired over the heads of the foreign devils.

"Two months of furious bombardments came to little. The improvised earthworks at the legations, organized by a young American mining engineer, Herbert Hoover, were not obliterated nor even breached in spite of the fact that the Chinese fired, or rather misfired, 3,000 cannon balls.

"To be sure, some of the people at the legations were killed. But miraculously few under the circumstances. The Chinese had murderous intent and the most modern technology with which to fulfill their ambitions. But their mind-set was too obsolete to use the new weapons effectively. In other words, they did not have an up-to-date grasp of reality."

This was like a battle between grownups and children. The Chinese and the foreign devils were both human, but they were clearly on different levels.

But the British and other "westerners" had a long way to go. Soon after this battle, they raised themselves to a higher level.

In Men, Machines, and Modern Times, Elting Morison relates the fascinating story of how the British and American navies adopted the practice of aiming guns before firing them. This was about a hundred years ago, about the same time as the battle described above. Before that, they could fire all afternoon at a ship and not hit it. That's not quite as egregious as the Chinese firing at an embassy for two months and not hitting it, but it's bad enough.

The ship's cannon were fired at a fixed angle. A sailor could adjust the angle once, to take into account the distance of the target; but when the angle was set, it was set. The ship, of course, was moving up and down in the water, but the sailors had no way to compensate for this motion.

At least no easy way. But one sailor (whose name was not recorded) tried to compensate for the motion of the ship. Instead of locking his gun in one position, he tried to adjust the angle in real time. The gears weren't set up in such a way as to allow this, but he tried to do it anyway. His officer noticed that he was more accurate than the other sailors, and watched what he was doing. The officer thought about how the guns could be redesigned so the sailors could aim them continuously.

When his design was adopted, the accuracy of the British Navy increased by 3,000 percent in a few years. What does 3,000 percent mean, specifically? Morison explains:

In 1899 five ships of the North Atlantic squadron fired five minutes each at a lightship hulk at the conventional range of 1600 yards. After twenty-five minutes of banging away, two hits had been made on the sails of the elderly vessel.

Six years later one naval gunner made fifteen hits in one minute at a target 75 by 25 feet at the same range -- 1600 yards; half of them hit in a bull's-eye 50 inches square.

This is impressive, and it certainly makes a decisive difference in a battle, but it's not the same kind of difference as the previous example. The difference between the Chinese and the foreign devils was fundamental: the Chinese had an animist model of reality, but the "westerners" had a scientific model. This is a qualitative difference, not just a matter of degree.

Now, of course, the Chinese fight battles the same way we do, because they think like we do. Mao Tse-tung introduced Marxism into China. Marxism is a combination of Jewish philosophy and European philosophy. Mao taught the Chinese to think like Europeans. They are no longer animists. They fire material bullets at material targets. Their third-world mentality has been replaced by a first-world mentality.

Whether this change is complete, and whether it's permanent (in China or anywhere else), are separate issues that I won't go into here. The point I want to make is that the change from animist to scientific was a discrete change from one mental state to another, not a continuous change. It was not a movement along an exponential curve, it was a step function.

When the British Navy adopted a new way of aiming guns, this was an incremental improvement within the scientific model. An improvement of 3,000 percent is a large increment, but it required no fundamental change in the British model of reality. It was a refinement of what they were already doing. They were already aiming their guns at the target. They just figured out how to do it a lot better.

When the British started aiming their guns in real time, that was part of an exponential curve, but strictly speaking they didn't increase their intelligence, they increased their precision. This is just one more example of the continually increasing precision in the mechanical arts that began in the middle ages. The curve was almost flat for several hundred years. It didn't turn up perceptibly until the French started making muskets with interchangeable parts about 1790. The steepness of the curve increased steadily in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 1960's the curve appeared to be exponential. Gordon Moore noticed that the number of transistors on a chip was doubling every year or two, and he called it Moore's Law. This is a special case of a phenomenon with a long history and an uncertain future.

It is our ability to make more and more fine-grained machines that is increasing exponentially, not our intelligence per se.

Is there another discrete level above the scientific model of reality? When the Chinese fired material bullets at the supposed spirits above their opponents' heads, that was a category mistake. It's an equally fundamental mistake to think that battles are only fought on a material level. It is possible to fire spiritual weapons at spiritual targets. When you hold a three year old on your knee and tell him stories, he lives in the world you create for him. Your mind contains his mind. That's the relation between the storytellers in Hollywood and the rest of us: we are children living in their world. They are winning battles in a war we are only dimly aware of. This too is a war between grownups and children, and we are the children.

Lenin said the surest way to destroy a nation is to debase its currency. An even more fundamental way to destroy a nation (or a mind) is to debase its language. The destruction of the Tower of Babel isn't just a mythical event in the ancient past, it's an ongoing process. The destruction of language is the most insidious weapon there is, and those who use it are indeed on a level above the rest of us. They are as far above us as the British were above the Chinese a century ago.



Superhumanity -- ?

Back at the beginning of his essay, Dr Vinge does not merely assume that AI systems reach our level and "wake up." He makes a stronger assumption:

There may be developed computers that are "awake" and superhumanly intelligent [emphasis added].

Superhuman computers are supposed to follow immediately from human-level computers:

...there has been much controversy as to whether we can create human equivalence in a machine. But if the answer is "yes, we can", then there is little doubt that beings more intelligent can be constructed shortly thereafter.

Excuse me? Little doubt?! This is the exact point that requires an argument. If we can create human equivalence in a machine, then it would certainly be possible to construct "beings" that are more intelligent, but how much more? Of course incremental improvement is always possible, but more intelligent is not the same as superhumanly intelligent. This latter concept needs to be examined.

Professor Vinge makes a distinction between "weak superhumanity" and "strong superhumanity." He says,

I call this "fast thinking" form of superintelligence "weak superhumanity"... "Strong superhumanity" would be more than cranking up the clock speed on a human-equivalent mind. It's hard to say precisely what "strong superhumanity" would be like...

It certainly is hard, but that's what needs to be done. He continues,

... but the difference appears to be profound. Imagine a dog mind running at very high speed. Would a thousand years of doggy living add up to any human insight?

No, it wouldn't. But it's not obvious how this applies to humans. Speed may or may not make a difference.

Speed is not sufficient for intelligence: if you start with a fool and speed up his brain, he is still a fool. He will just miss the point a hundred times faster. Nor is speed necessary for intelligence: there is an old proverb, "Still water runs deep." Albert Einstein was a perfect example. He wasn't a fast student, but he saw as deeply into physics as any of his faster colleagues.

On the other hand, it would be rash to assert that speed is irrelevant or useless. If you take somebody who is already bright, and speed up his brain, this should be a benefit. John von Neumann could read math and physics journals at full speed, the way ordinary people read a newspaper. If I could do that, I would accomplish a lot more than what I'm doing now. I would be "weakly superhuman" compared with my present level.

What if you could take von Neumann himself and speed him up? Would he be a genius on an even higher level? Not necessarily.

Sometimes my mind races. Thoughts fly by so fast that I can't keep track of them or make sense of them. I have not found this state to be productive (fun, maybe, but not productive). Some of my best ideas have come to me when I have taken my favorite elixir, which slows me down to just the right pace. Recently I have been trying to learn the trick of adjusting the pace myself.

Creative thought isn't the same as data processing. To say that thinking faster is always better is as absurd as saying that "Ave Maria" is more beautiful when you play it back at ten times the normal speed. There is an optimal tempo for music, and for creative thought.

Nevertheless data processing is an important part of what we do, and when we learn to do it faster, the difference may be dramatic. When we use computers to process data, it's like the British learning to aim their guns in real time. It was only an incremental improvement in their capability, not a fundamental improvement, but it gave them an unanswerable advantage in battle (until their opponents adopted the same technology).

To sum up this section: I agree with Dr. Vinge's point about speed. Sometimes it helps, and sometimes it doesn't, but in any case it only takes us so far. Going from fast to faster is not like going from an animist model of reality to a scientific model. If we are looking for the essence of superhuman intelligence, speed is not the place to look.

Dr. Vinge continues:

Many speculations about superintelligence seem to be based on the weakly superhuman model. I believe that our best guesses about the post-Singularity world can be obtained by thinking on the nature of strong superhumanity. I will return to this point later in the paper.

Actually Dr. Vinge doesn't say much about strong superhumanity later in the paper. He just takes it for granted that there is such a thing, and that we already know what it is. He is more concerned with trying to decide how we should feel about it than with defining it or establishing its existence. But he does say a couple of things about it. Two paragraphs later he says this:

A strongly superhuman intelligence would likely be a Society of Mind with some very competent components.

If one of the components is already strongly superhuman in its own right, this comment gets us nowhere. If not, he needs to demonstrate that a combination of human-level intelligences (or weakly superhuman intelligences) can be strongly superhuman. In any case, this comment is no help at all in arriving at a definition of "strongly superhuman."

Toward the end of the paper he says

A central feature of strongly superhuman entities will likely be their ability to communicate at variable bandwidths, including ones far higher than speech or written messages.

A high bandwidth connection doesn't necessarily accomplish anything. It depends on who is being connected to whom. If the entities are not already strongly superhuman, a high bandwidth connection isn't going to take them to that level. This is like the point discussed above, where you speed up a fool's brain and still have a fool. If you wire fools together with a high bandwidth connection -- even a telepathic connection! -- you just have a bigger fool. We already have millions of people sending messages back and forth via AOL instant messenger, and many of them have high bandwidth connections, but that doesn't create a superhuman entity.

We also have people who are not fools sending messages to each other on the internet, and this does multiply their intelligence, but they are still basically on the same level. The scientific community is at most a "weakly superhuman" entity.

Bandwidth by itself doesn't take us from human-level intelligence to a higher level, any more than speed does.

If strongly superhuman intelligence is going to be fundamentally different from human intelligence, then it will require a fundamentally new language: a new syntax, a new concept of "entity," and a new concept of "concept" (among other things): a new model of the world. The mind has a model of itself, and going from one level of intelligence to a higher level would involve creating a new model, which would be expressed in a new language.

But is there a model of the mind, or of the universe, that is qualitatively better than the one we have? Is there a model as far above the scientific model as the scientific model is above the animist model? I think there must be, for three reasons:

(1) There must be some basic fallacy in the way we think about the world, because quantum mechanics is totally counterintuitive to us. A strongly superhuman mind would be able to look at the double slit experiment and say "Well, yes, of course. What's wrong with that? Why does that bother you?"

(2) There have been a few occasions in my life when the fog lifted and I have experienced states of mental clarity that were not just incrementally better than my usual state. There was a qualitative difference, like going from an animist mentality to a scientific mentality. It's impossible to describe this in ordinary language. I think there must be a language in which it could be described.

(3) As mentioned above, we all live our lives in stories created by storytellers. (This term refers to the whole subculture of directors, producers, publishers, editors, etc., not just writers.) Their minds contain our minds. They know what's going on and we don't, just like we know what's going on and dogs don't. This line of thought suggests that when we try to imagine a superhumanly intelligent entity, we may be looking in the wrong direction. We may not be looking at the right kind of intelligence or the right kind of entity.

If there is a model of reality beyond our present scientific model, there is no way to know a priori how long it will take us to discover it. We don't have to wait for AI systems to catch up with us. Our reaching the next level of intelligence doesn't depend on computers reaching our level. Those two things have nothing to do with each other. If AI systems do catch up with us, that doesn't imply that we (or they) can take the next step. We may discover a new model of reality before AI systems catch up with us, or a long time after. If they never catch up, that doesn't prevent us from discovering the new model. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that we can do it at all.

If there is a model of reality beyond our present scientific model, and hence a level of intelligence far enough above us to qualify as "strongly superhuman," this does not imply that we could bootstrap ourselves to the strongly superhuman level. Nor does it imply that a human-level AI could bootstrap itself to the strongly superhuman level. A human-equivalent AI system would face exactly the same problem we face when we try to invent or discover the new model.

Nor does the existence of such a model imply that there is another model beyond that, and another one beyond that, ad infinitum. The existence of a strongly superhuman intelligence does not imply that such an entity could design an even higher intelligence, and so forth.

We are constantly improving our model of the world. Whenever you learn a new concept such as "epigenetic" or "eigenvector," you have extended your language and increased your intelligence incrementally. When you learn basic concepts such as "definition," "theorem," and "experiment," you have increased your intelligence in a more fundamental way. When you learn a whole new subject such as differential equations or economics, you acquire a very powerful set of conceptual tools that didn't come with your original human toolkit, and you become "superhuman" compared with your previous state.

People do this all the time. It's an ongoing process, not an intelligence explosion. When robots reach our level (where "our level" refers to scientists, not morons or animists), they will have to extend their model of the world in the same laborious way, subject by subject, concept by concept. It's not going to be any easier for them than it is for us.

This applies in particular to improving their model of their own minds. When robots reach our level, they won't be born knowing how their minds work. They will be the product of decades of evolution. Their brains will be a black box to them just as much as our brains are a black box to us. They will have to construct their own neuroscience. They will have to figure out how brains work (both their brains and ours), and it won't be any easier for them than it is for us. If and when they reach our level, it will be exactly as hard for them as it is for us.

The great changes in our future don't depend on AI systems reaching our present level. Nothing depends on that. That whole issue is a red herring.



The possibility of a next step -- redesigning our hardware

Back at the beginning of the paper, Professor Vinge lists four ways in which superhuman intelligence might emerge. The fourth is

Biological science may provide the means to improve natural human intellect.

Of the four, this is the one that he doesn't pursue. At this point I'm going to leave Vernor Vinge behind. From here on I'm just going to discuss my own ideas.

Suppose we start with a human being. We incorporate nanoscale devices into his or her cells, including brain cells. A nanodevice is like a new organelle, which monitors the activity of the cell and tweaks it or assists it as necessary. The artificial organelles are designed to mesh with the cellular machinery that is already there.

The next step is to suppose that some of the natural organelles in the cell are replaced by artificial organelles. In other words, at this stage the new organelles don't just act as adjuncts to the natural organelles, they take over certain tasks, so the original organelles are no longer necessary. For example, we could design an artificial lysosome that would clean up the cell and remove waste products better than natural lysosomes. Suppose this happens in all cells, throughout the body, including the brain.

Suppose that, over a period of time, more and more functions of the cell are taken over by artificial organelles, and finally the entire cell consists of artificial lysosomes, artificial mitochondria, artificial everything. The new organelles are not foreign objects inserted from the outside. There are artificial ribosomes which make the new organelles right there on site, in the cell. The chromosomes have been modified so that when the cell divides, the new cell has artificial organelles. The DNA code for the natural organelles has been removed.

It isn't necessary to carry this scenario all the way to its conclusion. Even at the earliest stages of this process, the humans who morph themselves into transhumans will be more intelligent than we are. To the extent that imperfections in our brains are holding us back, they will be superior. They will never be fogged out. They will have impeccable memories. Their attention spans will be longer than ours. Their brain cells will be able to secrete caffeine, THC, or any other molecule in the exact amount needed at any given time for maximum alertness and creativity (unless the government prevents this -- a caveat which applies to the whole scenario). They will be like we are at our best moments, only far beyond that, and their lucidity won't last just a moment, it will go on and on. This is transhuman consciousness, or hyperlucidity.

On page 15, "There is no Moore's Law for software," I wrote:

In hardware, one starts with the idea of a circuit, and then one implements this idea on successively smaller and faster substrates. Software doesn't work like that at all.

If we could start with an abstract idea of a mind, a model that is basically correct on the most general level, and if its capacity to think doubled when we implemented it on faster hardware, then we would have something similar to Moore's Law. But we haven't even taken the first step on this path. There is no such thing as software that embodies an abstract model of a mind.

Well, of course there is. Our own brains run "software" that embodies an abstract model of a mind, which is (more or less) correct on the most general level. That's not to say there is no room for improvement, but our model of ourselves is correct enough so that we are conscious.

When we have better brains, we will be able to design still better brains. When we start redesigning our brain cells, Moore's Law will apply to cells. They will improve exponentially. There is no obvious limit to how far this can go. Maybe it won't go all the way to The Singularity. I don't really care. We can definitely get as far as the Transhuman Metamorphosis. That's the important thing. What happens after that remains to be seen. We will find out when we get there.

This line of thought is continued on the cellular transformation page.



The possibility of a next step -- redesigning our language

This section is unfinished, and it may remain unfinished for some time. There's enough material here for a book. Here are some notes to indicate what I want to discuss:

the replacement of Roman numerals with Arabic numerals -- graphs (Nicole Oresme, 14th century) -- the development of mathematical notation in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, which made modern science possible -- this notation is still used and has become fossilized -- it's holding us back -- the possibility of making a fresh start and inventing a radically new notation for mathematics

the possibility of non-cryptic programming languages -- the application of user interface design to programming languages -- it's time to do the same thing in software that Doug Engelbart did in hardware: change the very idea of what a program looks like and how we interact with it

human language as a model of the world -- the appearance of grammar in ancient Greece and India (the first step toward an explicit model of language itself) -- Plato's Republic, the first explicit model of the human mind -- the appearance of the first dictionaries in the 17th century -- Kant, Bolzano, Frege, Russell, Principia Mathematica, Carnap, the idea of a metalanguage -- simulating the evolution of language -- the origin of language according to Calvin and Bickerton in Lingua ex Machina -- root words in Hebrew, Sanskrit, and German -- generating other concepts from root concepts -- the possibility of starting over with a new set of root concepts -- the application of genetic programming to language design -- the possibility of entirely new languages -- the convergence of computer languages and human languages

the quasi-three-dimensional nature of ordinary human consciousness (i.e. we think in three dimensions, but not very well) -- geometry in ancient Greece -- the development of explicit three dimensional perspective in the 15th century -- the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry in the 19th century -- the discovery of the quantum domain in the 20th century -- the possibility of projecting our consciousness into the quantum domain and seeing the world from the point of view of an electron (or a photon, or any subatomic wave/particle) -- the possibility of incorporating abstract mathematical space (non-Euclidean, higher dimensional, complex, topological, etc) into our consciousness and basing our language on it

On page 170 of Lingua ex Machina, William Calvin says

For every perfection-of-the-eye example, there are a dozen evolutionary examples of the equivalent of a bureaucracy stuck with an inefficient way of doing something because it can never back up and start all over again with an improved system.

Human language is like that. It's an accretion of kluges. There is nothing stopping us from starting over with a clean sheet of paper and designing a language that accurately reflects the structure of reality. This is one of the main tasks for philosophy in the 21st century.

As far as I'm concerned, this an ongoing activity. My thoughts are constantly in motion. My language continually transforms itself. Concepts are brought into consciousness, re-examined in the light of everything I have learned, and sent back to my memory with new connections. When I think about mathematics, I try to "look through" the notation to the underlying mathematical reality, and I am trying to conceive some kind of notation (using computer graphics) that will display the math in a more perspicuous way. Likewise for all the other things mentioned above.

This is something I do, not something an AI will do for me at some magical moment in the future. It's not something an AI could do for me. If I'm going to do it at all, I have do it myself.

This is Biocentric Transhumanism: it's not so much an ism as an activity.



"In him was life"

In discussions of AI and the Singularity, it is always assumed that it's up to us to create a superhuman entity. The idea that a superhuman mind already exists, and it creates us, is outside the bounds of the discussion. But I'm not sure why I have to stay within those bounds.

In the 915 Manifesto, I wrote:

Pot makes us aware that our minds exist within a larger mind -- a mind within which we live and move and have our being (as Paul said, quoting Epimenides). Getting stoned, really stoned at the highest level, is like a note becoming aware that it is part of a chord, part of a melody, part of a symphony -- a symphony that is always there, eternally, but usually outside of our awareness.

In our ordinary consciousness, we are cut off from the source of our being. What we are trying to do is re-connect with the source, so it will animate us all the time, and make every cell in our bodies resonate to that symphony, and transform us into creatures of light.

That's still what I'm trying to do. At this point in my life, pot no longer has that effect, and I stopped smoking it about three years ago. But that doesn't alter the fact that our minds are part of a larger mind. What marijuana showed me in the first few months after the breakthrough is still valid.

Going from our present level to a higher level requires both invention and discovery. It's partly a matter of inventing a new model of reality, as described above, but it also involves tuning in to a mind that is already there.



From pre-Cambrian to post-Cambrian

Vernor Vinge quotes Stan Ulam paraphrasing a conversation with John von Neumann: we appear to be "approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue." Here the word "singularity" is used not in the technical sense we find in math or physics, but in a more general sense: an event so extraordinary that our usual categories no longer apply. As I said above, I think this is a misnomer, but let that pass.

There isn't going to be an "intelligence explosion," as conceived by Vernor Vinge, but there could still be an event beyond which human affairs as we know them could not continue. Such an event could come from the advent of artificial life.

In his book  In the Blink of an Eye, Andrew Parker asserts that the nature of the Cambrian explosion is generally misunderstood. According to him, the internal body plans of all animal phyla were already there, and had been there for tens of millions of years. They evolved during the "Precambrian surge in evolution." Precambrian animals were soft wormlike creatures. "The Cambrian explosion is all about external body parts only," he says. The thesis of his book is that "Between 544 and 543 million years ago a revolution took place. During this one million year period, vision was born." Vision made predator/prey relationships possible, and that was what led to the development of hard body parts. His argument is plausible, but I don't know enough about the subject to decide whether it's true.

In any case, I think the Cambrian explosion is the best analogy for the transformation we are about to go through. As Moore's Law continues on its inexorable path toward the nanoscale, eventually nanodevices will mesh with cells, and the result will be a revolution comparable to the Precambrian surge and the Cambrian explosion, combined. The availability of cheap intelligence will have an effect similar to the development of eyes. It will revolutionize predator/prey relationships. The availability of new materials (carbon nanotubes, diamond...) will lead to hard body parts of a new order.

Cheap energy (i.e. a new energy generating organelle to replace mitochondria) will cause as profound a change as the transition from anaerobic to aerobic life.

Not only that, we have to consider the possibility of entirely new body plans, and even new substrates for life. There is no reason why we couldn't have organisms made of plasma, and there is no reason why life couldn't exist at the subatomic level. And when trillions of such organisms are wired together...  To repeat what I said above, combination organisms will soon include smart dust and grid computers which will use genetic algorithms to redesign themselves with less and less human supervision. If the capability of such combination organisms continues to grow exponentially, the result will indeed be a profound change.

As Andrew Parker says, 544 million years ago "Life was about to be stirred up."




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External links:

Vinge's own comments on his article - The Spring 2003 issue of Whole Earth magazine contains an edited version of Vinge's 1993 article, with his own comments added a decade later.
Singularity Watch -- John Smart's site
The Singularity Institute